Why is Buenaventura not buena ventura?

“Despite being located in a water-rich location, the city of Buenaventura struggles to get drinking water. Adriana Trejo, Claudio Moreira, and Suzan Dehati take a look at the issue from different perspectives to understand how the community and government participate with different solutions to the problem.”

Timeline of the Conflict (Trejo, 2021)

"Beautiful port of the sea my Buenaventura, where you can always breathe the pure breeze”. These are the starting verses of the chorus for “Mi Buenaventura” (1931), a song by Petronio Álvarez, who is a local artist that saw his theme become the hymn of the Colombian Pacific. Paradoxically, the theme “Marcando Territorio” (2011) by Libertad, is the one that tells the real story for the population of Buenaventura these days.

Racism, public health issues, violence and drug dealing business in the city are the topics that put the background for the song by Libertad, topics that are the daily struggle for the diverse communities of the city, who on top of all have to cope with less than five hours of water per day on their homes in the worst cases, and that is, if they even are connected to the network.

During the past two decades, the citizens of Buenaventura have been fighting for their right to potable water. The conflict started in the second half of the 20th century when, to supply for the workforce needed in the construction of the new port, the population in the city increased and the National Government of Colombia decided to appoint the task of operating both the port and the already deficient water network to a private company overseen by the Water and Sewer Society of Buenaventura (SAAB), the state agency. During the twenty years that the private company (namely Hidropacifico) has run, the service hasn’t improved.

Overwhelmed by the situation, the population of Buenaventura has risen up in two main strikes in the past seven years. As a result of the last strike in 2017, an agreement was made in which a new entity created by citizens (Comité por la Defensa del Agua y la Vida) is now participating in the agenda that will be executed after Hidropacifico’s end of contract in December 2021. The population is confident that this will help improve the water supply issue, but the question is: will the situation really change?

As a team of three students of the Master Programme of Water Management and Governance of Unesco-IHE, we explore the issue.

Picture of the 2017’s strike (Muriel, 2017)

Buenaventura located in a map (Google Maps, 2021)

To understand the conflict better, we contacted some local people involved from diverse standpoints. For this, we were aided by Clara Roa, a professor who has been doing research work with local communities involved in the conflict.

Video with interviewed

From a technical viewpoint, we knew that Buenaventura has a lot of water. We approached Tomas, engineer of the SAAB, who explained to us some particulars of the water supply and wastewater system of the city:

• Despite being in a heavy rain zone, water quality is excellent. Being in the middle of a dense forest allows for water to be clean and clear through filtration in the subsoil.
• The treatment plant is 100m above sea level with an installed capacity to treat 6,500 m3/h (156,000 m3/day), which allows for running all the supply system only by gravity, this keeps the operation costs to minimum.

Tomas says the water available from the Escalerete river, the main source of the system, is enough to supply the population of the city until 2045. So now our question was: Why, with these perfect conditions, Buenaventura does not have access to drinking water and sanitation?

Amongst the main problems, he said, “are the adduction for the city centre, illegal connections, and leaks (80% between commercial and technical) in the network. The structure needs investment to replace or rehabilitate the reservoirs, main pipes and household connections.”

Table.1 Treatment Plant Capacity and Water Consumption in Buenaventura (Own making, Data Source:

https://pt.climate-data.org/america-do-sul/colombia/buenaventura/buenaventura-49743/ )

As the table shows, the quantity of rain per year is abundant. Furthermore, the capacity of the treatment plant is twice Buenaventura´s demand. As a reference, the domestic water consumption per capita in the Netherlands is 129 l/day. (Eurostat, 2020)

Tomas took a deep breath and continued: “I don’t like to say it, but [...] illegal connections are a corruption issue that could be solved with some rules and law, but in Buenaventura [...] is fueled by many investments in the infrastructure [projects], and some parallel businesses from the power sphere. On the other hand, we have the afro-colombian population, who are used to living in the riverline so when they have water in their houses they use it carelessly.”

We realized that the water supply issue in Buenaventura was then, not only a technical problem, but one in which there were other figures and interests involved.

The perfect storm

In the decade of the 1990´s, after the burst of population in the second half of the 20th century, the main source of employment in Buenaventura (The Port) was privatized. As a result, many were fired. Left without a living wage, the social conditions of the population gradually deteriorated. They had their culture-based knowledge about fishing for a living but, attracted to the cover that the fishing business offered, the drug cartels took possession of the fisherman’s trading routes. Andrea Gomez, a local community member, explained to us how this business relationship worked for a while, offering benefits to both cartels and fishermen until the local authorities found out and took possession of all the fishermen's boats. “It was profitable but it came with many risks”, Andrea said.

Without a strong presence of the Government, this instability helped the irregular businesses open the path for the terror environment that exists today, thus creating a lasting perfect storm in which each bad condition paved the way for the next one, leading to the current status. We believe that throughout the conflict, the powerful forces are conscious of this inconvenient situation for the population, and that even take advantage of the tools they have to inherce their power, such as a flawed legal framework that doesn’t include a space for public participation, a weak law application system from the authorities, and “holes” on legal documents (constitution, private contract) to reinforce their power and act according to their interests. A similar concept is endowed by Austin Zeiderman when he recognizes that the powerful forces involved in the conflict (Government, drug-dealing cartels and Hidropacifico) reinforce one another, leaving the population unprotected from the consequences of their actions, in the center of what he calls “The Vortex” (Zeiderman, 2016).

A few years after the port privatization, in 2001, the National Government adopted the idea that a private entity should operate the water network. This is mentioned in its various official documents released for the past three decades, which also highlight the importance of the port as the main focus for investment.

We believe that this measure was in line with a similar model applied in other cities of Latin America that had fast-growing urban areas and a need to provide urban water and sanitation. This model, known as the Washington Consensus, was built on the pillars of market liberalization, fiscal austerity and privatization (Birdsal et. al, 2010). We had the opportunity to interview Camilo Duran, an academic that did his master research on the Buenaventura conflict, and he mentioned this model, which he believes is closely related to the issue.

The idealised privatization model

Hidropacifico is a company with Colombian capital, we believe this the main reason that this privatization still works after twenty years, in contrast of like many others in Latina America. After Hidropacifico took control of the water supply, the expectation was it would fix the network. Instead, the resources were not used efficiently and the company would not deliver a quality service. In recent years, after being questioned, Hidropacifico would justify itself by saying that that money would only cover for its operation costs, and was not enough to fix and maintain the network.

Relationships between the main actors in the conflict (Own making)

This argument also accounts for the different clients that Hidropacifico supplied water to. The company started to supply the port that needed ships filled with water, the tourism sector, and started a parallel bottled water business. Narcilo Rosero, leader of the Comité por la Defensa del Agua y la Vida that surged from the strikes, helped us understand this. All, according to Hidropacifico, was needed for subsistence of the company and to keep the service running.

But the truth is that since the start of Hidropacifico’s contract, the quality of the service only worsened, going from a supply of 8hr/day in the most neglected connections with the previous public administration (SAAB) to 4hr/day of water in some sectors of the city. (Acevedo, 2020)

In fact, according to Narcilo’s investigation, Hidropacifico unattended or took advantage of vague writings of more than 30 clauses of its contract. For example, they argue that their duty according to the contract was only to run the network, but not guaranteeing water access.

Meanwhile, the population adapted to live with water only in the hours it was provided by the sectorization system (opening and closing valves to provide certain areas with water at a time). According to Meliza Machado, a community member, the sanitation services are practically nonexistent for half of the population. In the community members we found a common denominator: they fought hard, but now they lost all hope they had for a change.

According to the community, the problem has two main causes: the conditions of the infrastructure of water network, which hasn’t been fixed by Hidropacifico, and the diversion of the economic and natural resources by the company and government to more prolific businesses, which include the aforementioned commercial activities, new construction megaprojects in different parts of the city (Masterplan) and businesses with drug dealing groups.

Masterplan for Buenaventura City (ICESI, 2017 )

Added to the government’s neglect and the water scarcity, the citizens had been suffering from the byproduct of those two main problems, which included: displacement of the population through racism and violence from drug gangs/armed groups, and health problems due to unavailability of water (mosquitoes from collected water and lack of basic hygiene).

In particular for the bajamar community (bajamar meaning low-tide), this violence and displacement is perceived in a deeper level, in which they argue that the system itself is not adequate to protect them as a culture, because the government, with the law and environmental risk assessment as arguments, requires that this community leaves the seaside areas that they have built themselves. For the community, taking them away from this land is destroying their culture, which they argue should be protected too. Some participants of the community even recognize the language used to refer to the area as damaging, because “bajamar” already has a negative connotation that implies that being there is incorrect (from the law and environmental perspectives is already recognized as incorrect), so they prefer the term “land gained to the sea” (Zeiderman, 2016) which recognizes what they have gone through to live there, this is part of their culture. We find the government and enterprise see the problem as a matter of resources and engineered solutions, but they do not recognize the complexity that comes with the caribbean culture that lives in the city.

All this led the community to rise on a strike in 2014. As a result, the population expected to receive the spotlight to finally solve these prolonged burdens. Their main water demand was 24 hr supply for all residents.

The big movement 

The first strike didn’t succeed as expected, but the idea remained in the citizen’s minds. The last drop fell when three years later, a prolonged cut left almost 5,000 residents without water. It was then, in May 2017, that over one third of the city’s population marched to demand for their access to water. (Guerrero, 2020)

Phrases such as “For the dignity of Buenaventura '' and "The Black People in the fight” could be read from the banners in the protest. The citizens blocked the main road from the port to the regional capital of Cali for several days. Though diverse, the protests of the movement were united by the lack of water. (Civic Strike in Buenaventura | Latin American Anti-Racism in a 'Post-Racial' Age - LAPORA, n.d.)

After the 23 days that the strike lasted, the government finally agreed to create a fund of 342 million USD to fulfil the demands of the city of Buenaventura. (Buenaventura's Strike: An Ongoing Demand for Justice in Colombia - WOLA, 2018)

Victor Vidal, one of the strike’s leaders, was elected the new mayor of the city from October 2019 onwards. Victor was independent from political parties and cut ties with the strike organising committee (Comité por la defensa del Agua y la Vida) after the election, but agreed to keep accounting to them during his period, working in cooperation with the previous public operator of the network, the SAAB, (Guerrero, 2020). He made his objectives to carry out the 2017 agreements and overcome corruption in the administration (Muriel, 2017). With the funds provided, these were promising plans.

The 2017 civil strike represented three main lessons learnt in the political and social dynamics:

• For the government leaders, it acknowledged the power involved in civil mobilization.
• For the general public, this event proved how important it is to get united as a community and speak for their rights.
• For Hidropacifico, it is a showcase to learn how mismanagement and lack of technical capacity ruin the reputation and future of a company

One the last mile, but did not make it

After Covid’s arrival in March 2020, the city faced a situation of unemployment and critical food security (Guerrero, 2020). Most of the funds kept destined to The Port, which didn't close business during the pandemic. The budget was tight to continue with the strike’s objectives.

Worsened by the deficiencies in the water supply service, Buenaventura was vulnerable to the virus. Arriving to an area with other already semi-permanent diseases that come from mosquito bites, covid stroke hard. On top of that, the lack of maintenance by Hidropacifico caused the main pipeline to collapse in June of the same year; Clara had the opportunity to witness this herself, and according to what she saw, of the two main pipelines, one was completely disconnected. This resulted in a prolonged water outage of 70%, which left the city with the highest mortality rate from Covid-19 in the region, and the morale of the population on the floor. (Guerrero, 2020)

What is up now for Buenaventura 

After more than two decades of struggle, the population is tired of fighting for their right to access to clean water and sanitation. The big players don’t seem to be stopping to check on whom they damage in their path, but they’ve faced a wall built with the never-ending spirit of these Caribbean personalities who, with their fight, have set an example for the meaning of the word resilience.

With the weight of the economic interest in the port, the National Government plans, and the armed groups on their shoulders, el Comité por la Defensa del Agua y la Vida, the SAAB and the Local Municipality headed by Victor Vidal, carry a titanic task of keeping the arrow in the right direction. Re-municipalisation of the sector could ease their way to a sustainable water network. Based on (Marwa, 2020) which analysed a similar situation in Jakarta, the critics of Jakarta’s water privatisation have believed that re-municipalization is the best way for addressing these inequities. Whether the privatization model and collateral private business stay is still to be defined, but one thing is sure: Hidropacifico will go, and this clears the path to take the next step.

Will this new administration have the right tools to resist the perfect storm? It certainly seems difficult. Hidropacifico’s end of contract is less than a month away and soon we’ll be able to witness how the story unfolds and if the new leaders can regain the community’s trust.

We can only say that this time, we’ll be watching, and hope that this article can bring other people’s attention to the issue too.

Water Awareness

One of the important issues that can improve the water sector is to raise public awareness for water usage and conservation. By the time the infrastructure is fully developed and the treatment plants start operating, the public and the government should be encouraged to use water efficiently. According to our analyses, this could be done through the following ways:

- The civil strike of 2017: The strike was a waking event to the public and the government. The public realised that the water problem they are facing is not because of water scarcity, but due to the mismanagement of the government. The public is aware of the origin of the issue in the water sector, and because of this awareness, they changed the municipality management and asked for the re-municipalization of the water sector.

- Media: Media can have a beneficial role for the government and the public to exchange their requests and messages through the platform. The government can create some written and visual contents that encourage the public to efficiently and healthy usage of water. Vice versa, the public can push the government through the media to improve service delivery.

- Local Programs: The government has the opportunity to conduct training and workshops for the local people to teach sanitary aspects of rainwater, and primary water treatment techniques if possible. The government can organize these programs in collaboration with the strike communities.

Summary of participants

Adriana Trejo is a Mexican Civil Engineer from the ITESM with experience in the private construction sector. She's currently doing her master of cience in the UNESCO-IHE Delft Institute for Water Education, coursing the programme of Water Management and Governance

Suzan Dehati did her bachelors in Economics from Kabul University of Afghanistan in 2019. She is currently pursuing her masters in Water Management and Governance at UNESCO-IHE Delft University for Water Education. She is passionate about worldwide water issues, and aspires to make her career in this field.

Cláudio Moreira is a Mechanical Engineer degree from Coimbra University, Portugal and an Executive MBA in Porto Business School, Porto University, Portugal. He is currently doing his master of science in the UNESCO-IHE Delft Institute for Water Education, coursing the programme of  Water Management and Governance.